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political  and  legal  international  relations.  And,  yet,  what  it  means  remains  elusive.  As  we 
discuss  whether  we  are  witnessing  the  demise  of  the  Westphalian  system,  it  is  critical  to 
understand state sovereignty today.  
 
Despite  the  resurgence  in  sovereignty  scholarship,  there  has  been  little  empirical work  done 
that  combines  political  and  legal  theory.  This  project  addresses  that  gap  in  the  current 
literature between political  science and  international  legal  research by providing an empirical 
study  of  how  sovereignty  is  conceptualized  in  international  legal  discourse.  The  theoretical 
basis  for  this paper  is  largely  informed by  international  relations theory of binding states and 
the  variability  of  sovereignty.  The  methodological  approach  is  legal  case  analysis.  Because 
sovereignty is such a slippery concept, the question of how to study it is tricky. This paper will 







contemporary  notions  of  sovereignty  fall  into  three  main  categories:  (1)  as  the  final  and 



























but  concepts  that  are  in  direct  tension  with  each  other,  if  not  actually  mutually  exclusive.  
Sovereignty is both the sphere of a state’s liberty without an independent normative status as 
well  as  the  description  of  the  state  endowed with  certain  rights  by  a  prior  normative  code.2  




authority  from  complying  with  certain  basic  norms.4    As  a  consequence,  the  modern 
conceptualization of sovereignty is in flux, alternating between two extremes. 
 

















there  is  something  about  sovereignty  that  has  not  been  replaced by  alternative political  and 
legal systems. For now, the sovereign state persists as the basis of political and legal systems.6  
 
If  we  can  agree  that  state  sovereignty  remains  a  vital  part  of  international  relations  and 
international  law  in the twenty‐first century, we should also be able to admit that we need a 
working vocabulary to discuss and analyze what  it  is.   There may have been a time when the 
classic conceptualization of sovereignty in the tradition of Bodin or Hobbes—based on the ideal 
that leaders of discrete territorial entities exclude all external actors from domestic government 
decision making—was a  satisfactory description, but  in  a world where both  the United Sates 
and Fiji are sovereign, we need a more nuanced vocabulary today.7 
 
The  recent  resurgence of  sovereignty scholarship  reflects a  shared sense  that no matter how 
overused and vague the term sovereignty is, it remains a critical part of international legal and 
political  relations.   Our world  is highly  interdependent  (as we know from crises  in our capital 








not approached  it as both the  legal and political subject that  it  is.   Contemporary universities 
divide the study of law and politics into different departments (even entirely different schools), 
leaving those subjects that span both disciplines inadequately studied.  Political scientists may 
be  too  skeptical  that  international  law  has  any  weight  in  international  relations,  and  legal 
scholars  may  not  be  skeptical  enough.    There  must  be  some  middle  ground  for  studying 
sovereignty from both the perspective of politics and law.  Jean Bodin was both a jurist and a 
political philosopher, as was Carl Schmitt, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay.    In  this project,  I 
want to begin to re‐integrate legal and political theories to study sovereignty.   This paper is a 
modest  first  step  in  a  larger  effort  to  provide  an  empirical  study  of  how  sovereignty  is 
conceptualized  in  international  legal  discourse  and  what  sovereignty  means  in  terms  of 
international relations theories concerning binding states and  international political structure. 












ways:    Firstly,  the  study  demonstrates  that  sovereignty  is  not  a  static  characteristic  resulting 
necessarily  from  certain  power  configurations,  but  rather  is  a  bundle  of  rights  and 
responsibilities  that vary according to both domestic and global context.   Secondly,  the study 
provides  a  taxonomy  of  “ideal  types”  based  on  lines  of  I.C.J.  cases  that  help  organize  our 













The  Prince  comes  as  close  to  the  traditional  notion  of  the  Westphalian  ideal  type  as  any 
incarnation of sovereignty.  This ideal type assumes all power resides in the state because the 
state exists.  In this version of sovereignty, the state does not need to justify, explain or validate 
its  actions  or  non‐actions.    There  is  no  higher  authority  than  the  state  in  the  international 
realm.  Sovereignty is the power of the state to accept or reject legal obligations.  
 
Jean  Bodin  and  Carl  Schmitt  best  articulate  this  ideal  type  of  sovereignty.    For  Schmitt, 
sovereignty is unlimited, undivided and foremost, a political concept.11  Political power controls 
legal power.  In other words, the sovereign state is the source of law and not the reverse.   
The  existence of  the  state  is  undoubted proof  of  its  superiority  over  the  validity  of  the  legal 
norm.    The  decision  frees  itself  from  all  normative  ties  and  becomes  in  the  true  sense 
absolute...The  sovereign  produces  and  guarantees  the  situation  in  its  totality.    He  has  the 



















breach of  its obligations under  international  law including the WHO Constitution?”13   Over 30 
states  submitted written  statements.14    Another  nine  submitted written  comments  to  those 
statements.15  The Court made it clear that its role is to “identify the obligations of States under 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2. LEGALITY OF THE USE BY A STATE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ARMED CONFLICT 
 
The  Court  addressed  the  issue  of  nuclear  weapons  again  in  1996  when  the  United  Nations 
General  Assembly  (“General  Assembly”)  passed  resolution  49/75  asking  the  Court:  “Is  the 
threat  or  use  of  nuclear weapons  in  any  circumstance  permitted  under  international  law?”19  
Nearly 30 states filed written statements.20  The Court concluded that it had both competence 
and  jurisdiction21  and  rejected  the appeal by  the United States,  the United Kingdom,  France, 
Finland,  Netherlands  and  Germany  to  use  its  discretionary  power  to  decline  rendering  an 









nuclear  weapons,  including:  (1)  the  right  to  life  guaranteed  in  Article  6  of  the  International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,25 (2) Article II of the Convention of 9 December 1948 on 


















environment,  as  stated  in  the Article  35  of  the Additional  Protocol  1  of  1977  to  the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 (prohibiting “methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be 
expected,  to  cause widespread,  long‐term  and  severe  damage  to  the  natural  environment”) 
and the Convention of 18 May 1977 on the Prohibition of Military and Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental  Modification  Techniques  (prohibiting  the  use  of  weapons  which  have 
“widespread,  long‐lasting  and  severe  effects”  on  the  environment);27  as  well  as  the 

















states  from  using  nuclear  weapons.    Some  environmental  treaties  explicitly  address 
environmental  protection  during  armed  conflict  (for  example,  General  Assembly  Resolution 
47/37 of 25 November 1992 affirms that environmental consideration is an element to be taken 
into  account  when  implementing  the  principles  of  law  governing  armed  conflict,  stating 
“destruction of the environment, not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly, is 
clearly contrary to existing international law”),31 but because not all states have become parties 
to  certain  environmental  treaties,  these  treaties  do  not  generally  prohibit  states  from  using 
nuclear weapons during armed conflict. 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Third,  the  Court  rejected  the  argument  that  the  United  Nations  Charter  (the  “Charter”) 
prohibited  the  use  of  nuclear weapons.32    The  Court  held  that  states  have  the  right  to  self‐



















of  self‐defence  in which  the  state’s  very  survival  would  be  at  stake.”35    However,  the  Court 
emphasized that there are certain fundamental rules of humanitarian law the must be observed 
by  all  states—regardless  of  whether  the  states  have  ratified  the  conventions  that  contain 
them—because  they  constitute  “intransgressible principles of  international  customary  law.”36  
Despite a general consensus among states that humanitarian law, as part of jus cogens, applies 
to  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons,  there  was  no  consensus  among  states  about  whether  this 
application prohibited the use of nuclear weapons.37 
 
The  Court’s  analysis  in  this  case  an  acceptance  that  the  state  can  use  whatever  means 
necessary to defend itself.  However, there are two sources of tension between the Prince and 










the  Citizen  in  this  case.    First,  although  the  Court  accepted  the  state’s  right  to  do  what  is 
necessary to defend itself, including using nuclear weapons, the Court held that states are still 
bound by certain fundamental principles of humanitarian law even when those states have not 
ratified  international humanitarian  conventions or  conventions directly  addressing  the use or 
threat  of  use  of  nuclear weapons.38    Second,  despite  the  requests  by  a  number  of  powerful 
states  for  the  Court  to  use  its  discretionary  power  to  decline  the  case,  the  Court  chose  to 
provide  an  advisory  opinion.    By  providing  this  opinion,  the  Court  has  supported  the  Citizen 
version  of  sovereignty  insofar  as  the  Court’s  action  supports  the  cause  of  international  legal 





3. FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE (SPAIN V. CANADA)  
 
In 1998, the Court rendered its decision in the fishing dispute between Spain and Canada arising 
out of an amendment  to  the Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act.    Spain  requested  the 
Court to declare, among other things, that Canada’s legislation claiming jurisdiction over ships 





In May  1994,  Canada  passed  legislation  (Parliament  Bill  C‐29  amending  the  Coastal  Fisheries 
Protection Act) extending protection of an area known as the Regulatory Area of the Northwest 
Atlantic Organization  (“NAFO”).    The bill  authorized  certain Canadian  “protection officers”  to 
ensure compliance with  the new  legislation by boarding and  inspecting any vessel within  the 
NAFO area and, with a warrant,  search any  fishing vessel and arrest  the person commanding 
the vessel, among other things.41  
 

















within  the  limits  of  its  declaration  concerning  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the  I.C.J.,  despite 
Spain’s  arguments  that  Canada’s  actions were  illegal  under  customary  international  law  and 
infringed on the sovereignty of a European member state.43  The Court held: 
It  is  for each State,  in  formulating  its declaration,  to decide upon the  limits  it places upon  its 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court: “This jurisdiction only exists within the limits within 












safety  here  is  not meant  a  bare  preservation,  but  also  all  other  contentments  of  life,  which 
every man by  lawful  industry, without danger or hurt  to  the Commonwealth, shall acquire to 
himself.46 
 
The Protector  justifies  its authority on  its ability  to protect  its own citizens and environment.  
Unlike  the Prince,  in which  the  state does not  justify  its  supreme power but  simply  claims  it 
because the state is, the Protector takes certain actions (or does not take certain actions) based 
on protecting its people and environment.   






















citizens.   This conceptualization  is a powerful argument  for  sovereignty because  it appeals  to 
the basic human desire to protect one’s self from harm, but in the most recent cases discussed 
below,  the  Court  has  rejected  protection  as  a  legitimate  reason  to  justify  a  state  breaching 
international obligations.        There  is  tension between  this  line of  cases and  the Prince  line of 
cases because, one the one hand,  the Court accepts  that sovereignty endows states with  the 
power to wage nuclear war to defend itself and the right to reject the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. in 
order  to  protect  and manage  the  environment  for  fishing,  but  on  the  other  hand,  the  Court 
rejects  a  state’s  right  to  build  a  wall  to  protect  its  citizens  from  an  acknowledged  terrorist 
threat and denies another  state’s  right  to  reject a Soviet‐era contract  in order  to protect  the 
environment.    There  is  no  simple  way  to  explain  the  discrepancy  between  the  two  lines  of 
cases.      The  apparent  logical  inconsistency  is  not  likely  to  be  resolved  by  the  I.C.J.  or  by 
prevailing norms of state behavior.  Rather, I think, the tension between the logic in the Prince 
and  the  Protector  underscores  the  importance  of  developing  a  functioning  vocabulary  to 
describe competing conceptualizations of sovereignty. 




the  legal  consequences  of  Israel  constructing  a  wall  in  the  Occupied  Palestinian  Territory 
(including  around  East  Jerusalem)?47    Over  45  parties  submitted  written  statements.48    The 
General  Assembly  based  its  request  for  an  advisory  opinion  largely  on  resolution  ES‐10113, 















vires  under  the Charter when  it  requested  an  advisory  opinion because  Security  Council was 
then actively  involved  in  the Middle  East.50    The Court,  however,  rejected  Israel’s  arguments 
because, among other things, the General Assembly has the authority to act when the Security 
Council has both (1)  failed to exercise  its responsibility  for maintaining  international peace as 
the result of negative votes of one or more permanent members and (2) there appears to be a 




breach  of  international  law.52    Pursuant  to  paragraph  3  of  Article  6  of  the  Fourth  Geneva 
Convention people living in the Occupied Territory “shall not be deprived, in an case or in any 













and  that  Israel  has  the  right  and  the duty  to  respond  and protect  the  life  of  its  citizens,  but 












stated  that  any  measures  Israel  takes  to  protect  its  citizens  must  conform  with  applicable 




the  importance  that  a  state  protect  its  citizens,  the  standard  a  state must meet  in  order  to 





The  question  before  the  Court  in  this  1997  decision  was  whether  Hungary  was  entitled  to 
suspend  (and  later  abandon)  the work  on  the Nagymoros  Project  and part  of  the Gabcíkovo 
project, which combined were part of a large barrage project on the river Danube initiated by 
the  Budapest  Treaty  of  1977  between  Czechoslovakia  and  Hungary  to  prevent  catastrophic 
floods,  to  improve  sailing  quality  and  to  produce  clear  electricity.    Hungary  argued  that  the 




The disagreement between  the  two  states was  straightforward and  the Court  simply  applied 
the  standards  necessary  for  showing  a  state  of  necessity  as  defined  by  Article  33  of  the 
International  Law  Commission.    In  order  to meet  that  standard,  Hungary must  demonstrate 
that  (1)  there  was  an  essential  interest  of  the  state  which  conflicts  with  its  international 
obligations, (2) the relevant interest was threatened by “grave and imminent peril” and (3) the 
act being questioned was  the  “only means”  the  state had of  safeguarding  the essential  state 
interest.61 
 
Although  the  Court  acknowledged  that  safeguarding  ecological  interests  was  an  essential 
interest of all states, the danger posed by the barrage of the Danube was not imminent in 1989 
when Hungary suspended its work on the project.62 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This case is significant in terms of defining the Protector because the Court directly addresses 
weighing environmental damage and complying with  treaty obligations.   What  is  intriguing  in 














community  of  states  and  people  within  the  state’s  own  borders.    The  state  as  Citizen  is 
antithetical  to  both  an  anarchical  and  hierarchical  international  structure.    That  is  to  say, 
sovereignty that relies on citizenship in a society of states does not allow for any state—even 
the most  powerful—to  reject  international  norms.    States  are  bound  by  norms  of  the  larger 
international community of  fellow states as well as obligations to citizens  living within states’ 
own borders.   Sovereignty,  that  is  the ultimate power  to decide, does not  reside  in  the state 
government  structure,  but  rather  is  dispersed  in  the  people  as  a whole  (and  their  collective 
right  to elect  their officials  and,  in  the extreme,  to  revolt)  and  the  community of  states who 
collectively  recognize  a  state  as  a  member  of  the  international  community  (and  hence  a 
“sovereign state”) or not depending on whether a state complies generally with the norms and 

















Deudney  argues  that  the  early  American  history  (between  the  establishment  of  the  Union 
beginning  in 1781 and  the American Civil Was ending  in 1865) provides  a  robust  example of 
such  a  negarchical  system.65  The  Philadelphian  system, with  its  “American  emphasis  on  laws 
and  procedures  to  resolve  conflicts  and  allocate  goods,”  relied  on  the  practice  of  legal 
procedures to moderate anarchical dynamics.66  Even in cases of territorial disputes, an area of 
“hard politics” notorious  for upsetting even  the most  liberal  structures, Deudney argues  that 
during  the  negarchical  period  of  American  history,  legal  proceduralism  took  precedence  of 
violence as a method for resolving conflicts.   One case he describes concerned a conflict over 





Since  the 1990’s,  the majority of  the cases  the Court has decided underscore  the developing 
importance of states binding themselves  in a nascent negarchical structure.   The cases  in this 
line  is  varied  but  they  share  two  central  themes  (1)  the  court  asserts  its  legal  authority  in 
defining  state  responsibilities  and  (2)  sovereign  states accept  legal procedures as a means of 
resolving  conflicts.    Furthermore,  in  this  conceptualization  of  sovereignty  there  are  no 
absolutes, but rather there is a sliding scale of “more or less” sovereign. Sovereign states bind 
themselves so as to avoid the potential violent consequences of unbridled power.   Sovereignty 
is  the ultimate power to decide, but  the scope of decisions that can be made  is  limited.   The 
Court’s reasoning in the Nuclear Weapons cases—cases that on one level strongly support the 
sovereignty as Prince—illustrates this scope limitation.  There is nothing in current international 
law  to preclude a  sovereign  state  from using nuclear weapons  in proportionate  self‐defense, 






to prevent the murder.   The mere fact  that murder happens, does not mean that  there  is no 
law against citizens killing each other.    I would argue that the reasoning applies to the  line of 
cases  that make up  the Citizen.    The  fact  that  states  can and do act  in ways  contrary  to  the 
general  norms  does  not  demonstrate  that  sovereign  states  have  not  bound  themselves,  any 
more so  than  the  fact  that citizens occasionally kill each other demonstrates  that  there  is no 
agreed‐upon  prohibition  of murder.    The  Citizen  is  not meant  to  predict  the  future  of  state 
                                                
65 Id. at 191. 
66 Id. at 208.  






1. CASE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND 
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA V. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) 
 
In  2007,  the  Court  rendered  its  decision  in  the  Case  Concerning  the  Application  of  the 
Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide.    Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina requested the Court to adjudge and declare, among other things, that the Federal 
Republic  of  Yugoslavia  (the  “FRY”)  had  violated  the  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and 
Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide  (the  “Genocide  Convention”)  by  destroying  and 
attempting  to  destroy  in  whole  national,  ethnical  or  religious  groups  within  the  territory  of 
Bosnia  and Herzegovina,  in  particular  the Muslim population.67    The  FRY  contended  that  the 
acts alleged were not committed.68 
 
First,  the  Court  confirmed  that  it  did  have  jurisdiction  based  on  Article  XI  of  the  Genocide 
Convention.69    Then  the Court  addressed  the problem of  the duality of  its  responsibility  that 
international  law  is  concerned  with  the  actions  of  sovereign  states  and  does  not  punish 
individuals.    The  Court  re‐stated  the  famous  phrase  from  the  Nuremberg  Judgment  that 
“[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract entities…”70 
 





















of whether  the Respondent  State of  Serbia  and Montenegro  could be held  responsible.    The 




Under  international  law,  a  state  is  responsible  for  any act  committed by  its  state organ.74   A 
state can also be held responsible for the conduct or persons, or groups of persons, who do not 






Applying  these standards  to  the evidence of massacres at Srebrenica,  the Court  found  that  it 
was  not  established  that  FRY  was  responsible  for  the  actions  of  those  who  committed  the 





decision  demonstrates  that  international  norms  require  states  to  comply  with  international 
laws within their own borders. States must comply with humanitarian law even within its own 
borders.   While  the  standard  the  Court  applied  to  determine  state  attribution  has  left  some 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2. LAGRAND CASE (GERMANY V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) 
 
This  2001  case  concerns  two German  nationals who  had  been  put  to  death  in  Arizona  after 
having  been  found  guilty  of  murder.  The  German  nationals  were  brothers,  Karl  and Walter 
Bernhard LaGrand, who had been found guilty of killing a man and severely injuring a woman 
during the course of robbing a bank in Arizona.  The brothers had been born in Germany, but 
although  they  had  lived  in  the  United  States  since  they  were  very  young,  they  had  never 
acquired United  States  citizenship.    As  foreign  nationals,  they were  consequently  entitled  to 
contact  their consulate under Article 36 of  the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations  (the 
“Vienna Convention”).   
 
Germany asked  the Court  to declare, among other  things,  that  (1)  the United States violated 
the Vienna Convention by not notifying the German consulate of the LaGrand brothers’ arrest, 








LaGrand  brothers  from  the  time  they  were  arrested.81    Apparently,  the  brothers  had  been 
adopted  by  an  American  and  “had  the  demeanor  and  speech  of  Americans  rather  than 
Germans.”82  The United States argued that not only did the brothers not identify themselves as 
Germans,  but  also  that  the  brothers  themselves  were  unaware  that  they  were  not  U.S. 
nationals.83    The  brothers’  court  appointed  counsel  did  not  raise  non‐compliance  with  the 
Vienna Convention in the defense and did not contact the German consular authorities.84  Even 
during  the  lengthy  period  of  appeals  after  conviction,  no  one  notified  German  consular 
authorities  and  the  brothers’  attorneys  did  not  raise  the  issue  of  failing  to  notify  German 
consular  authorities  as  required  by  the  Vienna  Convention.85    It  was  not  until  the  brothers’ 
counsel  had  filed  writs  of  habeas  corpus  that  the  Vienna  Convention  issue  of  consular 




















On  19  January  1999,  Germany  launched  proceedings  in  the  United  States  Supreme  Court 





complaint  against  Arizona  due  to  the  eleventh  amendment  of  the  U.S.  constitution,  which 
prohibits federal courts from hearing lawsuits of foreign states against a U.S. state.  Regarding 
Germany’s  claim  against  the  United  States,  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  held  the  doctrine  of 
procedural  default  was  not  incompatible  with  the  Vienna  Convention  and  that  even  if 
procedural  default  did  conflict  with  the  Vienna  Convention  it  had  been  overruled  by  later 




without  comment.    The  Arizona  clemency  board  recommended  a  stay  of  execution  to  the 




paragraph  1(b)  of  the  Vienna  Convention  when  it  failed  to  inform  Germany’s  consular 
authorities that it had detained German nationals;89  (2) the procedural default rule effectively 
prevented Germany  from  challenging  the  LaGrands’  convictions  and  sentences  under United 
States constitutional grounds, which prevented “full effect [from being] given to the purposes 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for  which  the  rights  accorded  under  this  article  [Article  36  of  the  Vienna  Convention]  are 
intended,”90 and (3) the I.C.J.’s power to indicate provisional measures is binding.91 
 
While  the Court’s  decision  favored Germany,  the Court  noted  that  the United  States had  (1) 






international norms  (and  the United States  took efforts  to prevent a  future breach), but also 
because  this case stands  for  the proposition  that a state’s  internal  laws must comply with  its 
external obligations.   The Court held that  the procedural default prevented the United States 
from  complying with  its  obligations  under  the Vienna  Convention.    In  other words,  this  case 
demonstrates states binding themselves in their internal and external actions. 
 
3.  CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO (DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO V. UGANDA) 
 
This  2005  case  concerns  whether  Uganda  violated  its  obligations  under  customary  and 
international  law,  including (1) the non‐use of force and the prohibition of aggression, (2) the 
obligation to settle international disputes peacefully, (3) to respect sovereignty and the right of 
people  to  self‐determination  and  (4)  the  principle  of  non‐intervention.93    The  Court 
acknowledged  the  “tragic  situation which  has  long  prevailed  in  the  Great  Lakes  region”  and 
noted  that  the  local  population  had  long  suffered  because  of  factional  conflictions  between 
Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  (“DRC”)  and  armed  groups  from  neighboring  states  (i.e.,  The 
Republic of Uganda).94  












Uganda  argued  that  the  DRC  consented  to  the  actions  of  its  troops  in  the  DRC  until  11 
September  1998  and  that  after  that  date  Uganda  was  acting  in  self‐defense.95    In  general, 










4. CASE CONCERNING TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME DISPUTE BETWEEN NICARAGUA AND 
HONDURAS IN THE CARIBBEAN SEA (NICARAGUA V. HONDURAS) 
 
This  2007  case  dates  back  to  a  colonial  dispute  in  the  early  1800s.    Both  Nicaragua  and 
Honduras had been Spanish colonies and became independent in 1821.  At that time Nicaragua 
and  Honduras—along  with  Guatemala,  El  Salvador  and  Costa  Rica—formed  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Central  America.    In  1838,  both  Nicaragua  and  Honduras  seceded  from  the 
Federation, maintaining the territory they had before they had joined the Federation.  In 1850, 









that according to the principle of uti possidetis  juris, each state “is  the owner of  the territory 
which  at  the  date  of  independence  constituted  respectively,  the  provinces  of  Honduras  and 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Because  the  islands  in  question  are  uninhabited  (or  not  permanently  inhabited),  the  Court 
found it difficult to determine effective control, and so turned to the question of whether there 
was  a  pattern  of  displaying  sovereign  authority,  even  if  those  displays were modest.105    The 
Court  reviewed  a  number  of  issue  areas  to  determine  displays  of  sovereignty,  including 
whether a state (1) applied and enforced criminal and civil law,106 (2) regulated immigration,107 



























to  the  example  of  negarchy  Deudney  described  in  which  Pennsylvania  and  Connecticut 
submitted  a  territorial  dispute  stemming  from  competing  colonial  charters  to  an  arbitral 










There  is  a  lot  of work  to  be  done  to  create  a working  vocabulary  of  state  sovereignty.      By 





the  larger  international  political  context?    (In  other words,  during  the  post‐war  period  of  bi‐
polar political  structure, was sovereignty discussed differently  than during  the brief period of 
American hegemony or during the current fluid multi‐polar political period?) 
•  Is  there  a  relationship  between  the  state  type  and  the  way  a  state  discusses 
sovereignty? (Stated differently, do dominant states tend to present sovereignty in similar ways 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While  there  is  no  clear  end  in  sight  for  the  tension  between  the  Prince  and  the  Citizen  (or 
between Schmitt and Kelsen) that Koskenniemi has so eloquently describes in his work, I hope 
that this paper serves as a starting point for creating a working vocabulary of state sovereignty 
and opens the conversation between international law and international relations about what it 
means to be a sovereign state. 
 
